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Introduction: Adversary Model
Adversary Success
The adversary is successful if she recovers the secret subkey k◦.
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Introduction: Differential Power Analysis in a Nutshell
The DPA (Differential Power Analysis) Problem
Given measurements i n (n ∈ {1, . . . ,N}) while the crypto device computes
function fk0 with random inputs xn:
Does a statistics prove significant differences of the measurements


















DPA Partitioning Functions g :
Single-bit partitioning function (Kocher et al., 1999)
Multi-bit partitioning/comparison function:
“All-or-Nothing” with a leakage model (e.g., Hamming weight)
(Messerges et al., 2000)
CPA (Correlation Power Analysis) with a leakage model (e.g.,
Hamming distance) (Brier et al., 2002)
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Introduction: Collision Analysis in a Nutshell
The CA (Collision Analysis) Problem
Given measurements i n (n ∈ {1, . . . ,N}) while the crypto device computes
the many-to-one function fk0 with random inputs xn:
Does a statistics prove high similarity of measurements with two



















Euclidean distance of measurement vectors over some t. (Schramm
et al., 2003)
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Our Approach
Objectives
Combination of leakage detection functions for DPA (Separation) and
CA (Cohesion).
Sensitivity to general leakage features
Multi-bit approach
using all measurements and
without the need for a good power model.
Multivariate approach
Idea
Our basic approach: Cluster Analysis
Our basic question: Do clusters of measurements exist?
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Differential Cluster Analysis
Requirement
fk : {0, 1}
u 7→ {0, 1}w is a many-to-one collision function, i.e., at
least two inputs xi , xi ′ ∈ {0, 1}
u with xi 6= xi ′ collide in one state
∆ ∈ {0, 1}w .
The DCA (Differential Cluster Analysis) Problem
Given measurements i n (n ∈ {1, . . . ,N}) while the crypto device computes
the many-to-one function fk0 with random inputs xn:
Does a cluster criterion function prove the existence of clusters of
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Measuring Clustering Quality
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JSOS evaluates inter-cluster separation. The optimal partition maximizes
JSOS .
The sum of JSSE and JSOS is a constant.
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Special Cluster Criterion Functions
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JVAR evaluates overall variance vs. intra cluster variances. The optimal
partition maximizes JVAR .












JSTT evaluates inter cluster separation, normalized by intra cluster
variances and cluster sizes. The optimal partition maximizes JSTT .
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Differential Cluster Analysis (General Approach)
Differential Cluster Analysis (General Approach)
1 For each subkey hypothesis k:
Sort measurements into 2w clusters D0, . . . ,D2w−1 according to
∆i = fk (xn) (1 ≤ n ≤ N).
Compute a cluster criterion function: Jk .
2 Rank the pairs (k, Jk) according to Jk .
3 Output subkey candidate that leads to the best clustering quality.
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Detailed Comparison with CA and DPA
DPA CA DCA
Many-to-one function
not required required required
Leakage model
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Comparison with DPA: An Example
Example
Assume fk : {0, 1}
u 7→ {0, 1}2 is a many-to-one function.
Single-bit DPA fails and
Multi-bit DPA (with Hamming weight model) fails.
Does this assure that there is no leakage at all?
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Example
Assume fk : {0, 1}
u 7→ {0, 1}2 is a many-to-one function.
Single-bit DPA fails and
Multi-bit DPA (with Hamming weight model) fails.
Does this assure that there is no leakage at all?
No. Counter-Example:
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Applications: Algorithmic Collisions
Algorithmic Collisions:
fk emerges from an abstract concept (e.g., cryptographic standard).
fk is implementation independent (despite of masking ...).
Example: DES
DES S-box function is 4-to-1: fk : {0, 1}
6 7→ {0, 1}4 yields 24 clusters.
Example: AES
AES S-box is not a collision function.
Targeting only r -bit (1 ≤ r < 8) of AES S-box outcome:
fk : {0, 1}
8 7→ {0, 1}r yields 2r clusters.
AES MixColumns transformation is 224 − to − 1:
fk : {0, 1}
32 7→ {0, 1}8 yields 28 clusters.
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Applications: Implementation Specific Collisions
Implementation specific collisions:
fk emerges from implementation properties.
fk is not obvious in the algorithmic description.
Example: AES Hardware Module
Differential of two adjacent data cells in the studied AES hardware
architecture: fk : {0, 1}
16 7→ {0, 1}8 yields 28 clusters.
fk(x) = S(xi ⊕ ki )⊕ S(xi ′ ⊕ ki ′) (1)
General DCA Approach requires 216 subkey hypotheses.
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AES Hardware Module: A New Attack Strategy
If fk(x) = 0 then fk(x) = S(xi ⊕ ki )⊕ S(xi ′ ⊕ ki ′) simplifies to
S(xi ⊕ ki ) = S(xi ′ ⊕ ki ′)⇒ xi ⊕ ki = xi ′ ⊕ ki ′ ⇒ ki ⊕ ki ′ = xi ⊕ xi ′ .





A new two-step key recovery attack:
1 Determine the correct xor-difference k◦i ⊕ k
◦
i ′ based on 2
8 hypotheses.
This is the difficult step that checks whether a special (small) cluster
for fk (x) = 0 exists.
2 Determine the correct pair (k◦i , k
◦
i ′) based on 2
8 hypotheses.
This is the easy step that checks whether up to 28 clusters exist.
Attack strategy can also be applied with DPA.
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DES Implementation in Software: Univariate DCA Results
Target Device: AVR Microcontroller
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DES Implementation in Software: Comparison with CPA
Table: Success rates in % for various univariate and multivariate attack scenarios.
Test Model Time N=15 N=20 N=25 N=30 N=40 N=50
CPA LSB overall 3 15 37 62 95 98
CPA LSB A 42 64 69 77 93 96
CPA LSB B 64 77 83 93 98 99
CPA LSB C 17 28 29 38 55 65
JSSE LSB overall 3 15 37 62 95 98
JSSE LSB A 42 64 70 77 93 96
JSSE LSB B 64 78 82 93 98 99
JSSE LSB C 18 28 31 38 56 65
CPA LSB AB 70 85 90 96 100 100
JSSE LSB AB 70 83 91 97 100 100
CPA LSB ABC 76 90 96 99 100 100
JSSE LSB ABC 78 94 96 99 100 100
L. Batina, B. Gierlichs, and K. Lemke-Rust ()Differential Cluster Analysis September 7, 2009 19 / 21
DES Implementation in Software: Comparison with CPA
Table: Success rates in % for various univariate and multivariate attack scenarios.
Test Model Time N=15 N=20 N=25 N=30 N=40 N=50
CPA LSB overall 3 15 37 62 95 98
CPA LSB A 42 64 69 77 93 96
CPA LSB B 64 77 83 93 98 99
CPA LSB C 17 28 29 38 55 65
JSSE LSB overall 3 15 37 62 95 98
JSSE LSB A 42 64 70 77 93 96
JSSE LSB B 64 78 82 93 98 99
JSSE LSB C 18 28 31 38 56 65
CPA LSB AB 70 85 90 96 100 100
JSSE LSB AB 70 83 91 97 100 100
CPA LSB ABC 76 90 96 99 100 100
JSSE LSB ABC 78 94 96 99 100 100
L. Batina, B. Gierlichs, and K. Lemke-Rust ()Differential Cluster Analysis September 7, 2009 19 / 21
DES Implementation in Software: Comparison with CPA
Table: Success rates in % for various univariate and multivariate attack scenarios.
Test Model Time N=15 N=20 N=25 N=30 N=40 N=50
CPA LSB overall 3 15 37 62 95 98
CPA LSB A 42 64 69 77 93 96
CPA LSB B 64 77 83 93 98 99
CPA LSB C 17 28 29 38 55 65
JSSE LSB overall 3 15 37 62 95 98
JSSE LSB A 42 64 70 77 93 96
JSSE LSB B 64 78 82 93 98 99
JSSE LSB C 18 28 31 38 56 65
CPA LSB AB 70 85 90 96 100 100
JSSE LSB AB 70 83 91 97 100 100
CPA LSB ABC 76 90 96 99 100 100
JSSE LSB ABC 78 94 96 99 100 100
L. Batina, B. Gierlichs, and K. Lemke-Rust ()Differential Cluster Analysis September 7, 2009 19 / 21
AES Hardware Module: DCA Results
Target Device: Prototype chip which implements an AES-128
co-processor in 0.13 µm sCMOS technology without countermeasures.
General Approach with DCA:
216 key hypotheses
key recovery with approx. 5000 measurements
Two-Step Attack Strategy with DCA:
29 key hypotheses
key recovery with approx. 50 000 measurements
Step 1: 50 000 measurements
Step 2: 5000 measurements
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Conclusion
Introduction of Differential Cluster Analysis (DCA) – a new technique
bridging the gap between Collision Analysis (CA) and Differential
Power Analysis (DPA).
Introduction of implementation specific collisions.
Confirmation of DCA on both software (DES) and hardware (AES)
implementation.
New two-step attack strategy for an AES hardware module.
Collision attacks on AES are not constrained to 8-bit software implementations on
simple controllers anymore...
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